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nothing about the character ofthe Delaware chapter ofthe Brotherhood since
it failed to link the beliefs of the California chapter to the Delaware chapter.
Id. at 1098. The Court thus concluded
that the narrow phrasing ofthe stipulation impermissibly invited the jury to
infer that the abstract beliefs of the
Delaware chapter were identical to those
of the California chapter. Id.
The Court assumed for the sake of
argument that the beliefs of the Delaware chapter were shown to be racist,
concluded that evidence of Dawson's
membership in the Brotherhood was
nevertheless irrelevant because both
Dawson and his victim were of the
same race. Id. The Court distinguished Dawson from other cases
where it had held membership in an
organization to be relevant for sentencing purposes. In those cases, the membership was in some way related to the
underlying crime of conviction and
probative of the defendant's bias or
indicative of his propensity for future
violence. Id. (citingBarciayv. Florida,
463 U.S. 939 (1983)) For example, in
Barclay, the defendant's membership
in the Black Liberation Army was relevant in a sentencing proceeding because the underlying conviction was
for the murder of a white hitchhiker.
Similarly, in United States v. Abel, 469
U.S. 45 (1984), the evidence of the
defendant's and a defense witness'
membership in the Aryan Brotherhood
was relevant because the members
were sworn to lie on behalf of each
other.
Unlike these cases cited by the
Court, the stipulation as to Dawson's
membership in the Delaware chapter
of the Brotherhood was not related to
the underlying conviction and did not
establish that the Brotherhood had a
propensity for violent acts. Therefore,
Dawson's membership in the Brotherhood was not relevant to the sentencing proceeding. Dawson, 112 S. Ct. at
1098.
Finally, the Court rejected the state's
assertion that the stipulation was relevant to prove any aggravating cir-

cated by mere courtroom repetition,
the Court reasoned that the Confrontation Clause did not require proof of
unavailability before the statements
were permitted under exceptions to the
hearsay doctrine.
Petitioner, Randall D. White, was
charged with the sexual assault ofS. G~,
a four year old girl. Trial testimony
established that on April 16, 1988,
S.G.'s babysitter, Tony DeVore, was
awakened by screams coming from
S.G.'s room. Upon nearing S.G.'s
bedroom, DeVore witnessed White
leaving the room. DeVore identified
White as a friend ofthe child's mother,
Tammy Grigsby. According to
DeVore's trial testimony, S.G. stated
that White had put his hand over her
mouth, choked her, threatened to whip
her ifshe screamed, and had "touch[ed]
her in the wrong places" (indicating
the vaginal area).
S.G. 's mother found her daughter
"scared" and a "little hyper" when she
returned home about thirty minutes
after DeVore had first been awakened.
S. G. repeated her claims to her mother,
which led Grigsby to call the police.
Officer Terry Lewis questioned S.G.
alone upon arrival at the Grigsby residence a few minutes later. Lewis'
- David E. Canter summary of S. G. 's statements at trial
indicated that, again, the child had
White v. Illinois: SPONTANEOUS given the same account oftheevening's
DECLARATION AND MEDICAL events. The hospital personnel who
EXAMINATION HEARSAY EX- examinedS.G. that night, nurse Cheryl
CEPTIONS DO NOT OFFEND Reents and Dr. Michael Meinzen, heard
SIXTH AMENDMENT CON- essentially the identical story S.O. told
FRONTATION CLAUSE RE- DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis.
S.O. did not testify at petitioner's
QUIREMENTSREGARDLESS OF
DECLARANT'S AVAILABILITY. trial, due to emotional difficulty upon
In White v. IllinOis, 112 S. Ct. 736 entering the courtroom. DeVore,
(1992), the United States Supreme Grigsby, Lewis, Reents, and Meinzen
Court held that the Confrontation testified at trial, all relating the account
Clause of the Sixth Amendment ofthe ofthe incident as told to them by S.G.
U.S. Constitution does not require a Petitioner objected on hearsay grounds
declarant to testify at trial or be found to the testimony of these witnesses,
unavailable by the trial court where the regarding S.G. 's statements to them.
declarant's testimony can be admitted The trial court overruled each objecunder an established hearsay excep- tion on the basis of relevant hearsay
tion. Because the declarant's out-of- exceptions. Testimony given by
court statements carried substantial pro- DeVore, Grigsby, and Lewis was adbative value that could not be dupli- mitted under the spontaneous declaracumstance. Id. The Court recognized
that in certain instances membership in
an organization, such as one that endorses racial killing, may be relevant
to the jury's inquiry as to whether a
defendant would be likely to commit
futureviolentacts. However, the Court
reasoned that the inference which the
jury was invited to draw from the stipulation proved nothing more than the
abstract beliefs of the Delaware chapter of the Brotherhood. The Court
concluded that with nothing more than
an abstract showing of Dawson's beliefs, the admission of the stipulation
violated Dawson's First Amendment
rights. Id.
In Dawson v. Delaware, the United
States Supreme Court refined the test
for determining the admissibility of
evidence oforganizational associations
and beliefs in a sentencing proceeding.
Evidence ofa defendant's associations
or abstract beliefs must be relevant to
the issues being decided or related to
the underlying conviction in order to
protect a defendant's First Amendment
rights. This decision illustrates the
Court's fear that the defendant may be
unfairly prejudiced by the admission
of such evidence.
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tion exception, and that of Reents and
Meinzen was received under the exception for statements made in the
course of securing medical treatment.
Petitioner's motion for mistrial based
on S.O. 's "presence [and] failure to
testify" was also denied by the trial
court.
The jury found petitioner guilty of
aggravated criminal sexual assault, residential burglary, and unlawful restraint.
The Appellate Court of Illinois affirmed the conviction, holding that the
trial court had properly exercised its
discretion in ruling that the statements
offered by the aforementioned witnesses qualified for the relevant exceptions to the hearsay doctrine.
The Illinois Supreme Court denied
certiorari to petitioner. The Supreme
Court, however, granted certiorari to
address the limited issue of whether
permitting such testimony violated
petitioner's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right.
The Court found that S.O. 's statements, as repeated by various witnesses,
were reliable, carrying substantial probative value adequate to qualify as
well-established exceptions to the hearsay doctrine. White v. Illinois, 112 S.
Ct. 736, 743 (1992). This, the Court
reasoned, satisfied Sixth Amendment
concerns of confrontation, which do
not require that the declarant either be
present at trial or be found unavailable
before hearsay testimony may be admitted. [d. at 741. The Court found
unavailability analysis necessary only
where the out-of-court statements at
issue were made at a prior judicial
proceeding. [d.
Petitioner's primary contention was
that Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56
(1980), demanded his conviction be
vacated, under the theory that the prosecution must either produce the
declarant at trial or prove the declarant
to be unavailable prior to the introduction of hearsay testimony. The
court rejected the argument. White,
112 S. Ct. at 741. In Roberts, the Court
considered a Confrontation Clause
challenge involving the introduction at
26 - The Law Forum/22.3

trial oftestimony from a previous probable-cause hearing, where the witness
was not present at the trial, but was
subject to cross examination at the
hearing. [d. While implying that the
Sixth Amendment generally requires
that a declarant either be produced at
trial or found unavailable before hearsay testimony may be received, the
Court in Roberts nonetheless rejected
the Confrontation Clause argument.
[d.

In the case at bar, however, the
Court reasoned that Roberts's expansive reading of the Confrontation
Clause was negated by the subsequent
decision of United States v. [nadi, 475
U.S. 387 (1986). White, 112 S. Ct. at
741. In light of[nadi, where the Court
considered the admission of hearsay
statements made by a co-conspirator in
the course ofthe conspiracy, the Court
read Roberts to represent the "proposition that unavailability analysis is a
necessary part of the Confrontation
Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were
made in the course of a prior judicial
proceeding." [d. (emphasis added).
The statements made by S.O. in the
case at bar were distinguished by the
Court from those made in Roberts,
where the statements sought to be introduced were made at a prior court
proceeding, and thus, lost no
"evidentiary value if the out-of-court
statements were replaced with live testimony." [d. at 743. S.O. 's statements
made under the stress of a startling
event and in the course of procuring
medical treatment, however, carried
unique and valuable guarantees ofcredibility that the jury may not perceive if
repeated by the declarant in the antiseptic environment of a courtroom. [d.
''The preference for live testimony ...
is because of the importance of cross
examination. . .. But where [the]
proffered hearsay has sufficient guarantees of reliability to come within a
firmly rooted exception to the hearsay
rule, the Confrontation Clause is satisfied." [d.
The Court also rejected the adop-

tion of an "unavailability rule," which
would require that a declarant either be
present at trial or be found unavailable
prior to the introduction of hearsay
testimony. [d. at 742. The Court stated
that implementation of such a rule
would prove to be neither an absolute
bar to out-of-court statements, nor aid
in the fact-finding process. [d. Such
a rule, the Court noted, would merely
prove an additional burden on litigants
without offering any additional protection to an accused's Sixth Amendment
right to face his accuser. [d. The rule
would make it necessary to repeatedly
locate and keep available each
declarant, even ifneitherparty intended
to call such witnesses to the stand.
The Court concluded that an
individual's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause right is not violated
by the introduction of hearsay testimony under the spontaneous declaration and medical examination exceptions, irrespective of the declarant's
availability. Under the Court's reasoning, the nature ofthese exceptions demands that such utterances not be repeated by the declarant in the clinical
atmosphere of the courtroom, as they
would lose their situational sincerity
and value.
The Court thus continued a trend of
Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause interpretation where only probative evidence, which is based on a
"firmly rooted" hearsay exception, or
otherwise carries particular guarantees
of credibility, is admissible. In so
doing, the Court opened the door to
further litigation over the reliability of
such out-of-court statements, as each
state may observe and give credence to
hearsay exceptions not unanimously
accepted. The amendment was originally ratified to prevent the abuses of
prosecution by ex parte affidavits in
sixteenth century England. Therefore,
interpreting the Confrontation Clause
to regulate the admission of hearsay
may unnecessarily strain the actual language and original intent of the framers of the Sixth Amendment's Con-

frontation Clause.
- Paula Elbich
Hilton v. South Carolina Public. Railway Commission: FEDERAL STATUTE IMPOSING LIABILITY ON
ST ATE-OWNED RAILROADS
FOR DAMAGES TO INJURED
EMPLOYEES ENFORCEABLE IN
STATE COURTS ONLY.
In Hilton v. South Carolina Public
Railways Commission, 112 S. Ct. 560
(1991), the United States Supreme
Court held that the Federal Employers'
Liability Act continued to authorize
suits for damages against state-owned
railroads and was enforceable in state
courts, but not in federal courts. In
reaching its decision, the Court determined that a federally-based action
brought in state court did not abrogate
a State's immunity from suit under the
Eleventh Amendment to the United
States Constitution, because that
amendment has been held not to apply
to state courts. The Court's ruling
ensured that state-employed railroad
workers would have a forum in which
to redress work-related injuries.
The South Carolina Public Railways Commission, an agency of the
State of South Carolina, was a common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by railroad. Kenneth Hilton, a
railroad worker, claimed to have been
injured while on the job due to the
negligence ofthe Commission. Under
South Carolina law, railroad workers
were excluded from coverage under
the workers' compensation statute.
Thus, in order to recover for his injuries, Hilton sued the Commission underthe remedial provisions ofthe Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
in a federal court.
While Hilton's case was pending,
the Supreme Court decided the case of
Welch v. Texas Department of Highways and Public Transportation, 483
U.S. 468 (1987), holding that a federal
statute which incorporated the remedial provisions of FELA, did not allow
a cause of action to be maintained

against a state agency in a federal court.
In light of this decision, Hilton dismissed his suit in federal court and
refiled in a South Carolina state court.
The state trial court dismissed Hilton's
claim, basing its decision upon a reading of Welch, together with the subsequent Supreme Court decision of Will
v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58(1989). Thetrialcourt
interpreted these cases as precluding a
FELA suit for damages against a state
agency, even if maintained in a state
forum. Hilton appealed and the state
supreme court aff"rrmed the lower court's
decision.
Reversing the state courts' decisions,
the United States Supreme Court drew
a sharp distinction between a FELA
based action maintained in a federal
court and one in a state court. The Court
recognized that a FELA action brought
in federal court implicated the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from
suit. Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys.
Comm 'n, 112 S. ct. 560, 563 (1991).
Applying an Eleventh Amendment
analysis, the Court found that FELA
did not contain a clear expression of
congressional intent to abrogate the
States' Eleventh Amendment immunity, and therefore, FELAactions could
not be maintained in a federal court. [d.
(citing Welch, 483 U.S. at 474-76).
Because the Eleventh Amendment
has been held not to apply to state
courts, the Court determined that a
FELA action brought in a state court
did not implicate any constitutional
rule of law. [d. at 565. Thus, Hilton
presented a case of pure statutory construction, which left the Court to decide
the issue ofwhether Congress, in enacting FELA, intended to create a cause of
action against the States to be enforced
in a state court. [d.
The Court re-examined its first interpretation of FELA in Parden v. Terminal Railway ofAlabama Docks Department, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). The
Court noted that in Parden the terms of
FELA were construed to mean that
when Congress used the phrase "[e]very
common carrier by railroad" to describe

the class of employers subject to
FELA's terms, it intended to include
state-owned railroads. Hilton, 112 S.
Ct. at 563 (citing Parden, 377 U.S. at
187-88). The Court then reaffirmed
that interpretation, holding that FELA
continued to authorize suits for damages against state-owned railroads. [d
The Court concluded, however, that
the second part of its decision in
Parden, which held that by entering
the business of operating a railroad a
State waived its Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suit in a federal court,
had been overturned by its subsequent
decision in Welch. [d. at 563. Thus,
the Court narrowed the issue presented
to whether FELA based actions could
be enforced in a state court.
The Commission contended that
this issue was controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Will v.
Michigan Department ofState Police,
491 U.S. 58 (1989). Hilton, 112 S. Ct.
at 565. In Will, the Court held that a
State is not a ''person'' suable under a
federal statute which lacked any "clear
statement" of congressional intent to
impose liability. [d. at 563 (citing Will,
491 U.S. at 58). The Commission
argued that the "clear statement" rule
should be read in context with the
Court's decision in Welch, that FELA
did not contain a clear statement of
congressional intent, to effectively
overturn the entire holding ofParden.

[d.
The Court disagreed, reasoning that
the "clear statement" rule should not
automatically be implemented when a
case did not involve an issue ofconstitutional interpretation. [d. at 565-66.
Instead, the Court categorized the clear
statement rule as a canon of statutory
construction in those cases which did
not implicate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity. [d. In resolving a case of pure statutory construction, the Court found the doctrine of
stare decisis most compelling because
it promoted stability, predictability and
respect for judicial authority. [d. at
563-64. In the instant case, the Court
determined that the policy consider-

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 22.3/I'he Law Forum - 27

